Establishing a Global Quarantine Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 1
I. EXISTING FRAMEWORKS TO COMBAT WMD PROLIFERATION ..................................................... 4
A. Export Controls...................................................................................................................... 4
B. Deterrence.............................................................................................................................. 6
C. Defenses ................................................................................................................................. 8
D. Counterforce .......................................................................................................................... 9
E. Interdiction ........................................................................................................................... 11
II. A NEW APPROACH: GLOBAL QUARANTINE .............................................................................. 16
A. The Evolving Law of Self-Defense ....................................................................................... 16
B. Building Blocks of a Global Quarantine.............................................................................. 26
1. International Maritime Organization ............................................................................... 26
2. U.N. Security Council ....................................................................................................... 29
3. Proliferation Security Initiative ........................................................................................ 32
CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................. 35

INTRODUCTION
Faced with mounting international insecurity, in 1937 Franklin Delano Roosevelt gave
his famous “Quarantine Speech,” likening the rise of fascism to an outbreak of world
lawlessness. “When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread,” FDR remarked, “the
community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the
community against the spread of the disease.”1 Fearful of becoming embroiled in another world
war, the United States was slow to shed its isolationism, only gradually increasing the provision
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For the text and audio of FDR’s speech, see http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/text/us/fdr1937.html (last visited Jan.

29, 2005).
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of arms to its allies and restricting exports to the Axis powers.2 When war finally came at Pearl
Harbor, Nazi and Japanese forces had expanded like a cancer throughout Europe and Asia,
requiring far more than a quarantine to eliminate the malignancy.
Today the world confronts another danger that is on the brink of developing into an
epidemic: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD3). With the Indian and
Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998, the clandestine nuclear progress of North Korea and Iran, and
over a dozen nuclear-capable states waiting indecisively on the sidelines, the world has arrived at
what is fairly described as a “nuclear tipping point,” where a few decisions to produce WMD
could spark a cascade of proliferation.4 Such an outcome could have some stabilizing effects
through the functioning of nuclear deterrence, but it would also create an expanding supply of
material for catastrophic terrorism as well as raise the stakes between adversaries with fingers on
the WMD trigger when conflicts do occur. Since convincing nascent WMD-states to disarm is an
uncertain prospect,5 I argue that the United States and the international community should lay the
2

See ROBERT A. DIVINE, RELUCTANT BELLIGERENT: AMERICAN ENTRY INTO WORLD WAR II (1979). For instance,

although the United States instituted a “moral embargo” against Japan as early as July 1938, it was not until July
1941 that it imposed a complete embargo.
3

Use of the collective term WMD carries the risk of overlooking important distinctions among nuclear, biological,

and chemical weapons. At the same time, WMD is a simple, commonly understood, and analytically useful
shorthand. I will note differences among the types of WMD when relevant, but will primarily focus on nuclear
weapons.
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See THE NUCLEAR TIPPING POINT: WHY STATES RECONSIDER THEIR NUCLEAR CHOICES (Kurt M. Campbell et al.

eds., 2004).
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Reaching a negotiated settlement with states like North Korea and Iran along the lines of the December 2003

agreement with Libya would clearly be the most desirable outcome. See infra note 17. Unlike Libya, however, North
Korea and Iran both have fairly advanced WMD programs that they will likely be reluctant to give up. Even so, it is
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foundation for a global quarantine6 against WMD, prohibiting all forms of transfer.
Unfortunately, international law does not currently authorize such a system, forbidding only
WMD transfers made to non-state actors.7 Thus, I propose that the United Nations Security
Council, in conjunction with the International Maritime Organization, pass a resolution
construing the deliberate proliferation of such weapons—to states and non-state actors alike—as
a threat to the peace and an inherent act of aggression. A U.N. interdiction commission assessing
requests to intercept weapons in transit, working in concert with the Proliferation Security
Initiative,8 can then enforce this mandate.
Toward these ends, this article aims to explain why a global quarantine is needed, why it
is legitimate under international law, and how it can be established in an effective and ideally
multilateral manner. Part I assesses the legal and institutional options currently available to the
United States in combating the proliferation of WMD, briefly analyzing the strengths and
weaknesses of each. It concludes that the inherent deficiencies of existing arms control tools
require the creation of a new regime centered upon a robust interdiction authority. Part II then
explores how the international community can both legally justify a global quarantine upon

imperative that U.S. negotiators put forward a viable package of incentives to test the willingness of Pyongyang and
Tehran to disarm. If North Korea and Iran rebuff these proposals, it will be yet further proof that they are determined
to gain a fully-fledged WMD capability.
6

Inspiration to apply the quarantine concept to this topic is drawn partly from Ruth Wedgwood, A Pirate is a Pirate,

WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2002, at A12.
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See infra Part II.B.2. The lack of a legal foundation for intercepting suspect shipments was brought into sharp

relief in December 2002 during the So San incident. See infra Part I.E.
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The Proliferation Security Initiative, announced by President Bush in May 2003, is a multinational effort intended

to equip states to prevent WMD proliferation. See infra note 35.
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principles of self-defense, and practically integrate it into existing institutions. This article thus
represents the first effort to propose a comprehensive interdiction regime rooted in maritime law
and the concept of confiscating contraband materials in self-defense.

I. EXISTING FRAMEWORKS TO COMBAT WMD PROLIFERATION
The proliferation of WMD is a multi-layered phenomenon, fueled by global trade, arms
sales, indigenous research and development, and covert transfers to non-state actors. Defending
against such a complex threat, in turn, involves a wide array of legal, institutional, and strategic
mechanisms. States can adopt export controls to reduce proliferation generally, issue threats to
deter the use of WMD, build defenses to minimize the damage from a WMD attack, take military
action to disarm a potential adversary, or police the channels proliferators use to exchange
weapons. This Part will analyze these frameworks, concluding that although each has merit,
interdiction in particular is emerging as a crucial but legally underdeveloped option.
A. Export Controls
Some observers recommend strengthening export controls to keep sensitive technologies
off the international market, thereby restraining the ability of states to produce WMD.9 While
effective to an extent, the trouble is that increasingly proliferation is fueled by “dual-use” items,
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See, e.g., Daniel H. Joyner, Restructuring the Multilateral Export Control Regime System, 9 J. CONFLICT &

SECURITY L. 181 (2004). Efforts to dismantle and secure uranium from the former Soviet Union, such as the “NunnLugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,” are another important mechanism to reduce the chance of nuclear
materials falling into the hands of terrorists. See GEORGE PERKOVICH ET AL., UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE: A
STRATEGY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY 54-56 (2004) (draft). However, as with export controls, these programs will not
reach the potential WMD proliferation of new nuclear states producing fresh supplies of weapons-grade uranium
and plutonium.
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goods with civilian purposes that also have military applications.10 Companies and governments,
often more attuned to the immediate prospect of financial gain than the long-term security risks
of questionable sales, do not always ensure that buyers are using their products for the intended
purpose.11 Similarly, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enables states to acquire sophisticated
nuclear reactors and technology that are ostensibly for civilian power production, but which a
state can ultimately divert to weapons development either in secret or if it chooses to terminate
NPT safeguards. This potential loophole has led to proposals to place the supply of fissile
material under international control, rather than continue to promote complete indigenous
development.12
Even if it were possible to reach international agreement over how to restrict dual-use
items and regulate fissile material, the reality is that we live in a post-proliferation world and so
in a sense the horse is out of the barn. North Korea is effectively a de facto nuclear state, likely to
be in possession of sufficient reprocessed plutonium to create half a dozen bombs and hard at
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For instance, in 2000 Japan imposed export controls on its PlayStation2 video game system because it could

process high quality images quickly, a feature much in demand for advanced missile guidance systems. PATRICK M.
MORGAN, DETERRENCE NOW 234 (2003).
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http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf ; George Bush, Remarks on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation
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work developing enriched uranium as well.13 Most analysts also suspect Iran, despite repeated
agreements with the European Union to suspend its nuclear development,14 of being well on its
way toward mastering the enrichment process and hence on the verge of becoming a shadow, if
not actual, nuclear power.15 The Pakistani nuclear mastermind Dr. A. Q. Khan’s international
bazaar may be no more, but it certainly appears to have had brisk sales while it was open for
business.16 Thus, bar a disarmament agreement along the lines of that reached with Libya,17 in
which Iran and North Korea agree to give up their weapons programs in return for aid and
improved relations with the West (which appears fairly unlikely), export controls will not turn
back the clock on these nascent nuclear states.
B. Deterrence
It does not necessarily follow that if some states acquire WMD, they will elect to use
them. One might expect that the fear of devastating retaliation from a military superpower like

13

Glenn Kessler, More N. Korean Bombs Likely, U.S. Official Says, WASH. POST, July 16, 2004, at A18; David E.

Sanger & William J. Broad, North Korea Said to Expand Arms Program, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2004, at A1.
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Peter Ford, Europe Persuades Iran to Cool Nuclear Program—For Now, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 16,

2004, at 7; Karl Vick, Iran’s Leader Backs Deal on Inspections, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2003, at A22.
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See Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/83

(Nov. 15, 2004), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-83_derestrict.pdf; see also
Douglas Frantz, Iran Moving Methodically Toward Nuclear Capability, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2004, at A1; Barbara
Slavin, Iran’s Nuke Plans May Be Unstoppable, USA TODAY, Aug. 30, 2004, at 13A.
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See Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003 (2004),
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/pdfs/721report_july_dec2003.pdf; see also David E. Sanger & William
J. Broad, From Rogue Nuclear Programs, Web of Trails Leads to Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3 2004, at 1.
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See James G. Lakely, Libya Will Dismantle Its Weapons, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2003, at A1.
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the United States would dampen any aggressive impulses on the part of a regional power with
WMD. In fact, it is very plausible that states like Iran and North Korea desire nuclear capabilities
because they may help in deterring the United States from intervening in their affairs or initiating
an invasion similar to that carried out against Iraq. The trouble with this perspective is that in
focusing primarily on the direct bilateral military balance, it risks neglecting the role of thirdparty actors. In 2001 the Taliban in Afghanistan may have been effectively deterred from taking
any offensive action against the United States, but it did not feel compelled to move against Al
Qaeda, enjoying sanctuary within its borders at the time. If a fundamentalist regime like the
Taliban were to come to power in Pakistan, it would not be far-fetched to envision a similar
symbiotic relationship with a terrorist organization, potentially with the clandestine transfer of a
nuclear weapon. States unwilling to face the virtually certain retaliation that a direct strike would
invite may be willing to run the risk that an indirect attack might be difficult to trace to its origin.
Also, even if a proxy attack is not a state’s intention, there may be financial incentives for
states to attempt to sell nuclear materials on the black-market. This would be a remarkably
dangerous game to play, but a state like North Korea may feel that it has no other choice given
its dire economic situation. Nor are WMD sales merely a pessimistic hypothetical; not only did
North Korea reportedly sell uranium to Libya18 and uranium hexafluoride to Pakistan,19 but in
negotiations with the United States, a North Korean official threatened that its willingness to sell
nuclear materials would depend on U.S. actions.20 This threat cannot be brushed aside, for if
WMD were to end up in the hands of a terrorist organization like Al Qaeda, there can be little
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David E. Sanger, The North Korean Uranium Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2004, at A9.
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Donald Kirk, N. Korea Flirts With “Red Line,” CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 28, 2004, at 7.
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David E. Sanger, North Korea Says it Now Possesses Nuclear Arsenal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2003, at A1.
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doubt that it would attempt to use them. In sum, relying on the power of deterrence to prevent
WMD attacks places a great deal of faith in a doctrine that is far from infallible and of little
meaning to terrorists.
C. Defenses
Relying on deterrence would not be as worrisome if there were robust defensive systems
in place to prevent WMD attacks or minimize their damage when deterrence failed.
Unfortunately, despite significant progress in some areas, many experts believe that the United
States has a long way to go in providing an adequate homeland security framework.21 The Bush
Administration’s multi-billion dollar national missile defense system lies at the center of
controversy, as skeptics claim that its low reliability22 and susceptibility to countermeasures will
not provide any meaningful strategic benefits.23 The critical issue is whether potential
adversaries will rely on a long-range missile threat, as opposed to other means of delivery such
as cruise missiles or infiltration. Given the challenges inherent in patrolling U.S. borders and
coastlines and the fact that customs officials inspect only about 2% of containers shipped to the

21

See, e.g., STEPHEN FLYNN, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE: HOW OUR GOVERNMENT IS FAILING TO PROTECT US

FROM TERRORISM (2004); GARY HART & WARREN B. RUDMAN, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AMERICA STILL
UNPREPARED—AMERICA STILL IN DANGER (2002).
22

Thus far, test results of the missile defense system have not been promising. See David Stout & John H. Cushman,

Jr., Defense Missile For U.S. System Fails to Launch, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2004, at A1.
23

See Richard L. Garwin, A Defense That Will Not Defend, WASH. Q., Summer 2000, at 109; George Lewis, Lisbeth

Gronlund, and David Wright, National Missile Defense: An Indefensible System, FOREIGN POL’Y, Winter 19992000, at 120.
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United States,24 there is an understandable concern that missile defenses might embody a
“Maginot Line” mentality that aggressive states could easily bypass altogether.
Domestically, the United States is a soft target with many points of vulnerability that
could result in greater damage than even a missile strike. Bio-terrorism against agriculture,
chemical attacks on public transportation systems or at public events, and “dirty” radiological
bombs all remain major fears. This is not to say that the United States has failed to take steps to
protect itself—the Department of Homeland Security has implemented many important
reforms25—but to point out that policy makers should not see domestic defensive measures as a
reliable failsafe. The attacks of September 11, 2001 were a harsh reminder of how difficult it is
to predict the manner in which terrorists choose to strike, and it may be that no amount of
defense will suffice against a determined attacker.
D. Counterforce
Considering the limitations of other protective measures, some commentators maintain
that the risk of certain states using WMD or supplying them to terrorists may be substantial
enough to justify disarmament by air strikes or even outright invasion.26 This option is nothing

24

Justin S.C. Mellor, Missing the Boat: The Legal and Practical Problems of the Prevention of Maritime Terrorism,

18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 341, 342 (2002). Through the Container Security Initiative, the United States has recently
reformed its customs rules to require every shipping company importing cargo to provide U.S. officials with
advance information on each container on their ships, along with other security measures. Mark Hosenball & Evan
Thomas, High-Seas Hunting, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 2003, at 44.
25

Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: A Better Prepared America: A Year in Review (July 20,

2004), http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0465.xml.
26

See, e.g., William C. Bradford, ’The Duty to Defend Them’: A Natural Law Justification For the Bush Doctrine of

Preventive War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1470 (2004); Guy B. Roberts, The Counterproliferation Self-Help
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new to U.S. military planners, who seriously contemplated contingency plans to destroy the
nuclear facilities of the Soviet Union at the start of the Cold War,27 China in the early 1960s,28
and North Korea during the crisis of 1993–94.29 However, until recently with the U.S. invasion
of Iraq, there have been very few efforts to sanction this type of preventive military operation
under international law. When Israel carried out a successful strike on Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear
reactor in 1981, destroying it just before plutonium production was to begin, world opinion
rejected Israel’s assertion of self-defense.30 As might be expected, the United States has since
become much more sympathetic to such claims. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell
remarked in 2002: “The Israelis did it in 1981. It was a clear preemptive military strike.
Everyone now is quite pleased even though they got the devil criticized out of them at the
time.”31
Putting aside the legality of such an attack for the moment, it is becoming increasingly
likely that Osiraq-style missions are a thing of the past. This is partly because of the potential for
Paradigm: A Legal Regime for Enforcing the Norm Prohibiting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
27 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 483, 518 (1999); John C. Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 794 (2004).
27

See Russell D. Buhite and William Christopher Hamel, War for Peace: The Question of an American Preventive

War Against the Soviet Union, 1945-1955, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Summer 1990, at 367.
28

See William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle:’ the United States and

the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64, INT’L SECURITY, Winter 2000-01, at 54, 68.
29

See SELIG S. HARRISON, KOREAN ENDGAME: A STRATEGY FOR REUNIFICATION AND U.S. DISENGAGEMENT 122

(2002).
30

See Uri Shoham, The Israeli Raid Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor and the Right to Self-Defense, MIL. L. REV.,

Summer 1985, at 191.
31

Glenn Kessler & Peter Slevin, Preemptive Strikes Must Be Decisive, Powell Says, WASH. POST, June 15, 2002, at

A16.
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devastating reprisals. For example, besides its uncertain nuclear forces, North Korea possesses
an artillery arsenal believed to contain some 10,000 long-range rockets, capable of devastating
the South Korean capital of Seoul, a mere fifty miles from the De-Militarized Zone.32 Also,
having learned from Osiraq, states fearful of becoming a target for such an attack are
increasingly dispersing their weapons facilities, placing them in hardened underground bunkers,
or locating them near civilian buildings to pose the risk of collateral damage.33 Iran’s suspected
enrichment facilities are effectively immune from air strikes, hidden in large government
complexes and in other secret locations.34 Granted, an outright invasion would probably uproot
the WMD development of both Iran and North Korea, but in the wake of the war in Iraq, this
appears politically, militarily, and financially unlikely for the near future.
E. Interdiction
Given these grim conclusions—the failure of export controls, the inadequacy of
deterrence, the uncertainty of defenses, and the impracticality of counterforce—it is crucial that
the United States have robust interdiction capabilities to prevent the transfer of WMD.
Recognizing this need, President Bush announced on May 31, 2003 in Krakow, Poland the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a multinational effort to equip states to prevent WMD
proliferation.35 The founding participants of the PSI issued a “Statement of Interdiction
Principles,” identifying specific areas of cooperation, particularly in sharing intelligence

32

Kim Myong Chol, Kim Jong Il’s Military Strategy for Reunification, COMP. STRATEGY, Oct. 2001, at 303, 313.

33

See Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2004, at 147.

34

David E. Sanger, U.S. vs. a Nuclear Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004, at 8.

35

See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation: The Proliferation Security Initiative (July 28,

2004), at http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/34726.htm.
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information and providing mutual consent in interdiction missions.36 Already the PSI has had
some notable successes, including the September 2003 interception of a freighter bound for
Libya with a shipment of uranium enrichment parts, which some observers believe was
responsible for Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi’s decision to accept inspections and disarm.37
The PSI is meant to “be consistent with existing national legal authorities and
international law and frameworks.”38 Generally, while a state has complete jurisdiction over its
airspace, territory, and internal waters, its authority diminishes in relation to the distance from its
coastline.39 Under the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction, vessels on the high seas40 “are
subject to no authority except that of the State whose flag they fly.”41 The primary exceptions to
this rule are listed in Article 110 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

36

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of

Interdiction Principles (Sept. 4, 2003), http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm.
37

See Robin Wright, “Ship Incident May Have Swayed Libya,” WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2004, at A18.

38

U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation, Fact Sheet: Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently Asked

Questions (FAQ) (May 24, 2004), at http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/32725.htm.
39

See Daniel H. Joyner, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation and

International Law, 50 YALE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 25, on file with author).
40

According to the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention, the high seas are beyond a state’s “exclusive economic zone,”

which is a maximum of 200 nautical miles from its twelve-mile territorial sea. United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, art. 3, 57, 86, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
(1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
41

S.S. Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 25 (Sept. 7). This principle was codified in

UNCLOS supra note 40, art. 92(1). See Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security
Initiative, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 526, 527 n.9 (2004). Byers also notes that the regime of high seas freedom also applies
to aircraft beyond a state’s territorial seas. Id. at 527 & n.13.
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granting warships the right to board and search a vessel when there is reasonable ground for
suspecting that it is engaging in piracy, slave trading, unauthorized broadcasting, lacks a flag, or
is flying a false flag.42 Unless one is willing to expand the definition of piracy to include WMD
proliferation, which is probably quite a stretch,43 this means that UNCLOS bars any state from
interdicting suspected WMD traffickers on the high seas without the consent of the ship’s flag
state.
The potential consequences of this restriction were brought into sharp relief in December
2002, when U.S. intelligence identified an unflagged North Korean freighter (the So San)
crossing the Arabian Sea and contacted the Spanish government to request that its navy stop the
vessel and inspect it for illicit cargo.44 Spanish special forces boarded the ship, uncovering a
cache of Scud missiles hidden beneath sacks of cement. Shortly thereafter, Yemeni government
officials came forward and claimed ownership, declaring that they had purchased the missiles
from North Korea for defensive purposes. Since international law does not bar such a sale, the
United States and Spain allowed the So San to proceed, accepting an agreement from the Yemeni
president not to make further purchases. This incident was disturbing not for its specific facts—
the boarding itself was legal because the ship was flagless—but rather because it highlighted the
limited legal authority that would exist for similar operations in the future. If the So San had been
flying a North Korean flag, and refused to consent to boarding, UNCLOS would prohibit
interdiction, even if there was a strong certainty that it carried WMD.
42

UNCLOS, supra note 40, art. 110(1).

43

See Joyner, supra note 39, at 34.

44

See Jofi Joseph, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Can Interdiction Stop Proliferation? ARMS CONTROL

TODAY, June 2004, at 7; Thom Shanker, Threats and Responses: Arms Smuggling; Scud Missiles Found on Ship of
North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2002, at A1.
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Making the best of its limited legal authority, the PSI is focusing on streamlining the
process for acquiring the consent of flag states to board their vessels, thereby bypassing
UNCLOS altogether. Besides the provisions addressing mutual consent in the PSI’s “Statement
of Interdiction Principles,”45 the United States has signed three ship-boarding agreements with
major shipping registry states (Liberia, Panama and the Marshall Islands), establishing bilateral
procedures for boarding vessels suspected of carrying WMD or related materials.

46

Modeled

after counter-narcotics arrangements, these agreements have the effect of limiting the number of
flag states a proliferating state can rely upon in transporting illicit materials under the protection
of UNCLOS. However, securing the assent of other key shipping registry states could be difficult
given that many states that offer “flags of convenience” (allowing registration with little
regulation or oversight) are highly dependent on the earnings from such transactions and may be

45

See supra note 36.

46

Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of

Liberia Concerning Cooperation To Suppress the Proliferation of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and
Related Materials By Sea, Feb. 11, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/np/trty/32403.htm; Amendment to the
Supplementary Arrangement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Republic of Panama to the Arrangement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Panama for Support and Assistance from the United States Coast Guard for the National Maritime
Service of the Ministry of Government and Justice, May 12, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/np/trty/32858.htm;
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the
Marshall Islands Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their
Delivery Systems, and Related Materials by Sea, Aug, 13, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/np/trty/35237.htm. Each of
these agreements enables a party to request that the other confirm the nationality of the ship in question and, if
needed, authorize interdiction.
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reluctant to grant consent.47 Unless the United States can reach ship-boarding agreements with
virtually all flag states, traffickers will retain options for shipping WMD effectively immune
from interdiction authority.48 Moreover, even if universal participation were possible, the most
likely proliferators, such as Pakistan, Iran and North Korea, could always elect to transport
WMD shipments under their own flag, thereby guaranteeing that consent would not be
forthcoming.
Realistically, if the United States were to receive intelligence reports indicating that a
North Korean ship was transporting a completed nuclear device on the high seas, the lack of
consent would surely not be a barrier to its decision to interdict. This poses a gap between the
stated objectives of the PSI and its legal authority to achieve them. The threat posed by WMD is
simply too great to allow a pocket of immunity under UNCLOS to prevent all interdiction efforts
without consent, regardless of the magnitude of the threat. The notion that some states should
profit from lending the use of their flag as a shield against inspection is likewise untenable in an
age of WMD. Instead, there should be a global norm against WMD proliferation that is allinclusive, holding any state that transports WMD responsible, regardless of nationality. The rest
of this article will focus on achieving this goal through a global quarantine.
This is not meant to imply that interdiction will suffice as an exclusive or even primary
strategy to combat WMD. Interdiction missions require extraordinary intelligence, timing and
coordination to be successful. Detecting plutonium is incredibly difficult given its faint radiation

47

See ANDREAS PERSBO & IAN DAVIS, SAILING INTO UNCHARTED WATERS? THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY

INITIATIVE AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 8-9 (2004).
48

See Joel A. Doolin, Operational Art for the Proliferation Security Initiative 5 (2004) (unpublished final paper,

Naval War College), available at http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/doolin.pdf.
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emission,49 and monitoring biological and chemical weapons is even more challenging since
their precursor elements are often dual-use in nature, posing the same dilemmas that plague
export control decisions.50 Far preferable are negotiated disarmament agreements and confidence
building measures that could eliminate the desire of states to acquire WMD in the first place.
However, given the limitations of arms control measures illustrated in this Part, if states do
choose to develop and sell WMD, interdiction may be the last viable line of defense against their
use. The alternative of active disarmament operations is far more dangerous, invasive, legally
questionable, and likely to spur yet further proliferation to deter such action.

II. A NEW APPROACH: GLOBAL QUARANTINE
Given that the provisions of UNCLOS will not support a robust interdiction regime, the
key issue is how to establish a legal foundation for a global quarantine against WMD. This Part
examines how the doctrine of self-defense provides conceptual justification for a quarantine, and
then explores how to integrate these principles into a functioning institutional framework.
A. The Evolving Law of Self-Defense
Article 51,51 the U.N. Charter provision concerning self-defense, has become highly
controversial, particularly given the events surrounding the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Some legal

49
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scholars claim that the specter of terrorists gaining access to WMD has undermined the central
premise of Article 51, leaving states unwilling to absorb an attack before taking action.52 Along
these lines, the U.S. National Security Strategy aims to re-conceptualize the notion of imminent
threat, reserving what it describes as an option to take preemptive (or, more accurately,
preventive53) actions against threats to national security.54 That is not to say that Article 51 lacks
supporters. The U.N. High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, a blue ribbon
commission convened by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to analyze emerging security concerns
and propose U.N. reforms, stated unequivocally in its December 2004 report that Article 51
“needs neither extension nor restriction of its long-understood scope.”55 This section will assess
these clashing positions, outlining how a global quarantine is supported by international law.
The drafters of the U.N. Charter, which celebrates its sixtieth anniversary on June 26,
2005, faced a very different international system than that which currently exists. The United
States had not yet dropped the atomic bomb on Japan, nor had the Soviet or American military
yet mastered the technology behind Hitler’s long-range V-2 rockets.56 Instead, the greatest
danger facing states at the time was the threat of land invasion or aerial bombardment, both of
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or
restore international peace and security.”).
52
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which had an obvious point of origin and often a tell-tale mobilization period. Biological and
chemical weapons existed, but the fear of retaliation based on the harrowing experience of World
War I kept their use at bay, and there was not yet an international terrorist movement that could
employ such materials without accountability. The terminology of Article 51 was thus enmeshed
in an international context with a very overt and unambiguous notion of what qualified as an
armed attack.57 Today, the prime danger to the United States is not an army charging across the
border, but an individual stepping off a plane with a suitcase of plutonium. Against what
columnist Thomas Friedman artfully describes as “people of mass destruction,”58 there is likely
to be little warning, limited ability to defend, and an uncertain target for retaliation.
W. Michael Reisman notes that innovations in science and technology often create a
“legal gap in which authority becomes uncertain. . . . When some of these factors change to the
point that communities can no longer assure their defense within the ambit of inherited law,
those charged with national defense inevitably demand changes in the law.”59 The unique
security circumstances surrounding air travel, for instance, has required corresponding
modifications in the interpretation of privacy law.60 The inherent difficulties of border control,
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likewise, have necessitated a relaxed standard of reasonable suspicion for checkpoint searches.61
It is inevitable that the threats posed by WMD and terrorism will also open up legal gaps that
policy makers and national security officials will draft legislation to bridge.62 The USA Patriot
Act,63 officially titled “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism,” is one such example.
The crucial issue is how to ensure that such legal remedies do not extend beyond the
apparent gap and begin to overreach, perhaps infringing upon civil liberties.64 In the domestic
setting, courts assist legislators in determining the proper constitutional bounds of enforcement
activity; the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld brief, suspicion-less searches at highway
checkpoints to combat drunk driving,65 but has declined to extend that authority to interdict
illegal narcotics.66 This kind of fine-tuned balancing is particularly problematic in the
international arena, which lacks comparable institutional authorities. Within the anarchic
international system, guiding rules are more malleable and infused with the irreducible potential
61
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of military force. In modern international law, Reisman observes, “Doctrines are positioned at
the interface of law and power.”67 The critical factor in whether a new claim is accepted and
incorporated into the corpus of international law is not its constitutionality but whether it serves
the “common interests of the aggregate of actors” and the “essential goals of law.”68 To
determine whether a global quarantine would serve the interests of international law and the
world community, it is necessary to return to the basic principles of self-defense.
Generally, individuals are not supposed to use force in response to threats to their wellbeing due to concerns of vigilantism. However, when the police are unavailable, individuals are
entitled to protect themselves even through violent action. Likewise, Article 2(4) and 39 of the
U.N. Charter reserve the authority to decide how to respond to breaches of the peace to the
Security Council, not to individual states.69 As with individuals, though, when a state is in
danger, the imperative of self-defense can transcend general prohibitions on the use of force and
the state can take immediate, forceful action in response.70 This right, moreover, is not limited to
purely local, reactive measures, but can extend abroad. According to Chief Justice Marshall, in
an opinion in 1804, a state’s power to secure itself from injury “may certainly be exercised
beyond the limits of its territory.”71 This principle underlies the right of a belligerent to search a

67

Reisman, supra note 59, at 90.

68

Id., at 89.

69

U.N. CHARTER, supra note 51, art. 2(4), 39.

70

The protective principle in international law, which bases jurisdiction on the adverse effect an individual’s action

has on a nation’s security, is in effect a derivative, collective exercise of personal self-defense. See Christina E.
Sorensen, Drug Trafficking on the High Seas: A Move Toward Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 4
EMORY INT’L L REV 207, 217 (1990).
71

Church v. Hubbard, 6 U.S. 187, 234 (1804).

20

D. Smith Global Quarantine February 2, 2005
neutral vessel on the high seas for contraband in an effort to interdict goods that could support an
enemy’s war campaign.72
Counter-balancing the right of self-defense is the notion of sovereignty, based on the
principle that a state should be free from interference in its domestic affairs if it has not violated
the rights of another state.73 It is not always clear what degree of deference to sovereignty is
appropriate, however, given the U.N. Charter’s parallel mandate in Article 2(4) that all member
states shall refrain from the threat of force “against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state.”74 Certainly sovereignty should not act as a shield protecting a state
from all foreign intervention up until the point that it attacks another state, regardless of its other
actions. If a modern-day Hitler were to come to power and begin to develop nuclear weapons,
FDR’s quarantine notion—and perhaps yet more active measures—would be only sensible.
Increasingly, scholars are defining sovereignty as a source of responsibility as much as a claim of
immunity.75 Under this conception, states may lose their sovereign status if they fail to protect
their citizens or become a menace to the international community by trafficking in WMD. A
72
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correlated duty of other states might be to forcibly prevent such nations from carrying out
genocide against their citizens or selling their weapons.76
Arguably, WMD in the hands of brutal and aggressive regimes may pose an inherent
threat to world peace, placing them at odds with Article 2(4). The question, though, is where to
draw the line that triggers the authority of other states to respond in self-defense. Article 51 on its
face allows self-defense only in response to an armed attack.77 The main rationale for a plain
reading of Article 51 is to eschew the unavoidable elasticity of self-interested interpretations of
what constitutes a threat to a state’s security. As Michael Glennon puts it, “What is self-defense
to one state is aggression, armed reprisal, armed attack, intervention, or forcible countermeasures to another.”78 States with axes to grind may set the threshold of danger artificially low,
instigating wars that might have been avoided through diplomacy, containment, or other
means.79 Instead, requiring the actual employment of force establishes a bright-line rule that is at
least theoretically unambiguous. The trouble with this standard is that such a restrictive notion of
self-defense is difficult to sustain in the modern day. According to one scholar, “The destructive
nature of [WMD] requires that the point of unacceptable danger move further in time from the
actual moment of aggressive use.”80 The United States cannot be expected to wait until an attack
like September 11th occurs before acting against a terrorist organization like Al Qaeda. In such
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circumstances, deterrence is untenable and there is little chance of reaching settlement or
providing an adequate defense.
To provide flexibility to Article 51’s bright-line rule, the U.N. High- level Panel invoked
customary law to identify a state’s right to defend itself against imminent threats.81 Based upon
former U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster’s principles articulated in the famous Caroline
Case, states can respond with proportionate force to a threat that leaves no choice of means and
not a “moment for deliberation.”82 Again, the problem is that even the standard of imminent
threat may be inadequate in responding to WMD proliferation.83 The Caroline principles are still
highly restrictive, and it is difficult to conceive of many real-world scenarios that would meet
their criteria. As Elaine Bunn points out, “the closer to the ‘imminent use’ end of the spectrum a
situation falls, the easier preemption is to justify politically, but the harder it may be to be
operationally decisive, because the adversary will likely have protected the intended targets of
preemption . . . .”84 A traditional standard of imminence still requires the United States to wait
81
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until the September 11th terrorists are about to board their planes, rather than go after the source
of the threat. President George Bush articulated this concern in his 2003 State of the Union
address: “Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have
terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they
strike?”85 At the same time, this does not mean that WMD possession is any more feasible of a
standard than use or imminent use. As Section I illustrated, counterforce against states with
WMD is extremely problematic, meaning that to be feasible the United States would probably
have to attack a state as it was in the process of developing WMD, a remarkably expansive form
of self-defense that is particularly liable to abuse and flawed intelligence assessments.86
The High-level Panel acknowledged that “The problem arises where the threat in
question is not imminent but still claimed to be real . . . .”87 In such cases, the Panel urged not the
abandonment of Article 51, but recourse to Article 39 of the U.N. Charter. Since Article 39
empowers the Security Council to recommend military measures in response to “any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,”88 a state that cannot legally pursue independent
action under Article 51 can always turn to the Security Council for authorization, even for a
preventive military operation.89 The dilemma with this alternative, as the world is well aware
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from the wrangling at the Security Council in the months prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq,
is the potential for Council stalemate or a veto in an authorization vote. According to the Panel,
if the Security Council elects to withhold its consent for a preventive action, “there will be, by
definition, time to pursue other strategies, including persuasion, negotiation, deterrence and
containment—and to visit again the military option.”90 While this reasoning might be convincing
in considering whether to attack and disarm a state that is gradually developing a WMD arsenal,
in which case there might be time to make a subsequent request to the Security Council down the
road, with interdiction missions there may be no second chance; once the weapons go they are
gone.
Article 39 alone, then, is insufficient to deal with fleeting windows of opportunity of the
kind associated with interdiction. Without a more robust and streamlined process, rather than risk
delay and dissension at the Security Council, the United States would probably act on its own (or
with other PSI participants), claiming a rationale of self-defense.91 To prevent this outcome, the
United Nations should provide an avenue for multilateral interdiction efforts, adopting a brightline rule against the transfer of WMD. Such a reform is in accord with the U.N. Charter because
the proliferation of WMD is not defensive; rather, it is a form of aggression against world order
that merits a limited form of protection in the same vein. When a state elects not merely to build
but to transfer WMD, placing other states in danger, it sacrifices the sovereignty its ships and
planes would traditionally enjoy in international waters and airspace. In a sense, even though
there may not be a traditional state of belligerency, the United Nations should treat WMD as
international contraband, permitting search and seizure when there is reasonable suspicion of
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their presence.92 To be sure, the potential for an abuse of interdiction power will remain, even
when carried out multilaterally. Establishing a global quarantine in principle will not eliminate
the problems of proof surrounding authorization of interdiction operations in practice, but it is a
step in the right direction. The next Section will attempt to map out a potential path for those
steps to take.
B. Building Blocks of a Global Quarantine
An effective global quarantine system will require an integrated framework of initiatives,
supplying both the legal foundation to establish a global norm against WMD proliferation and
the needed capabilities to carry out interdiction missions. There are doubtless numerous
combinations of means to achieve this end, but this Section will focus on those I believe are most
promising: first, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) can articulate general principles
forbidding the transfer of WMD on the high seas; second, the U.N. Security Council can pass a
resolution binding the international community to these rules, thereby extending Resolution
1540; finally, the PSI can enforce these provisions, acquiring a U.N. mandate as needed. These
three proposals are not mutually exclusive, since the PSI can always act independently as a last
resort, but they would ideally operate complementarily.
1. International Maritime Organization
The London-based IMO, established in 1948 to promote maritime safety, has adopted
about forty conventions and protocols since its inception.93 At a December 2002 Conference on
Maritime Security, IMO members approved a number of amendments to the 1974 Safety at Sea
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Convention94 (SOLAS), establishing a comprehensive new security regime for international
shipping that entered into force in July 2004.95 The centerpiece of these changes is the
International Ship and Port Security Code (ISPS Code), requiring all vessels and port facilities to
develop security plans in order to reduce their vulnerability to terrorism.96 Initial reports indicate
that by August 2004 nearly 90% of the over 9,000 declared port facilities had approved security
plans.97 The ISPS Code also requires a number of tracking, monitoring, and security alert
systems that should be useful in WMD interdiction missions.98
Perhaps more relevant to a quarantine regime is the IMO’s 1988 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation99 (SUA). Originally
drafted to ensure the extradition and prosecution of persons who attacked or attempted to seize
ships at sea, the IMO’s Legal Committee began reviewing the SUA Convention in the wake of
September 11th to consider amendments that would broaden the range of covered offenses to
include acts of terrorism and introduce provisions for boarding vessels suspected of being
involved in terrorist activities.100 Specifically, the United States proposed including boarding
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provisions that would streamline the process of gaining consent from flag states to inspect their
vessels, similar to those included in its agreements with Liberia, Panama and the Marshall
Islands.101 At its October 2002 meeting, the Legal Committee also discussed seven proposed
criminal offenses, two of which concerned the use of a ship to transport WMD.102
The Legal Committee’s response to the American proposals has been mixed. At a
meeting in April 2004, the Committee “[R]ecognized that the inclusion of boarding provisions
implied a substantial inroad into the fundamental principles of freedom of navigation on the high
seas and the exclusive jurisdiction of flag States over their vessels.”103 The moment of truth
regarding the proposed SUA revisions will come in October 2005, when the IMO holds a
diplomatic conference to adopt the amendments.104 Ideally, there will be a clear pronouncement
condemning the transport of WMD for any reason, complementing similar resolutions at the
U.N. Security Council. The IMO should also take a firm stance against the abuse of flag state
privileges, developing rules that hold flag states and shippers responsible if their cargo contains
WMD.105 These provisions will then form the normative substructure for building a global
quarantine regime.
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2. U.N. Security Council
In April 2004, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1540, its
strongest proclamation against the proliferation of WMD to date.106 Acting under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter, Resolution 1540 mandates that “all States shall refrain from providing any
form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess,
transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of
delivery.”107 It also requires all states to “adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws” to
prevent assisting non-state actors and to “establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation
of [WMD].”108 A special committee of the Security Council is responsible for monitoring the
resolution’s implementation based on reports from member states, the first of which were due in
October 2004.109 On the positive side, Resolution 1540 is a step forward because “it makes
strong national controls and enforcement a requirement rather than an option.”110 At the very
least, it reaffirms the universal appreciation of the threat posed by WMD, and forces states to
examine their own nonproliferation laws and practices. The United States should work together
with its fellow members on the implementation committee to seriously examine the reports
submitted and offer model legislation to states that fall short of compliance.111
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At the same time, Resolution 1540 only addresses part of the WMD threat and, despite its
reporting requirements, lacks any meaningful provisions for enforcing its mandates. By far the
most glaring limitation is the specific restriction of several portions of the document to non-state
actors. It may be true that non-state actors represent the most serious WMD threat, but this
restriction clashes with Resolution 1540’s unqualified opening statement that proliferation
constitutes a threat to international peace and security.112 Even if a WMD transfer takes place
between states, it represents proliferation and is a threat to international security. Every sale,
every shipment, leads to a greater supply of WMD materials and further opportunities for
diversion onto the black-market. A follow-on resolution should thus expand the scope of
Resolution 1540 to apply to all transfers of WMD, regardless of the status of the proliferation
recipient. It should also explicitly declare that no transportation method of WMD materials will
receive sovereign protection, being an affirmative danger to the security of all states.
Resolution 1540 is also very conservative in its enforcement procedures, merely calling
upon all states, “in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent
with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in [WMD].”113
Given that current international law does not allow for any form of nonconsensual interdiction on
the high seas, willing WMD traffickers can still flaunt nonproliferation norms, notwithstanding
what their national legal authorities say on the books. As mentioned in Part II.A, it is always
possible that the Security Council could authorize a one-time interdiction mission under Article
39.114 Without the institutional and legal framework to support such a claim, however, this seems
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highly unlikely. Alternatively, the United States, perhaps with the assistance of its PSI partners,
could take enforcement matters into its own hands, along the lines of NATO’s military action in
Kosovo in 1998.115 The Kosovo operation may have been successful and thus received tacit
assent, but it is far from a favorable precedent for strengthening the role of the Security Council
in international affairs.
To ensure its continued relevance in nonproliferation matters, the Security Council
should embrace Resolution 1540’s implementation committee, institutionalizing it and seeking to
integrate it with the growing PSI framework. As proposed by several observers, the Security
Council could establish an “interdiction committee” empowered to decide cases on short
notice.116 In effect, an interdiction committee could serve to expedite Article 39 claims. Since the
intelligence supporting interdiction is often of an extremely sensitive and fleeting nature, such a
committee would be ideally suited to serve the dual needs of secrecy and speed.
Correspondingly, the United States and other PSI members would be more likely to take their
claims to the United Nations if such an institution was in existence, particularly if it was
supported by an extended Resolution 1540 and new reforms under the SUA Convention.
No matter what system interdiction takes place under, there will always be concerns over
the quality of intelligence and the consequences of boardings that uncover nothing. China in
particular has expressed great skepticism of the PSI partly because of the false alarm in the 1993
interdiction of the Chinese vessel Yinhe, which U.S. intelligence services suspected of carrying
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chemical weapons precursors to Iran.117 Unfortunately, beyond pooling intelligence resources
and establishing a reviewing body at the Security Council, there is no sure-fire way to avoid
mistakes. One possible compromise, listed in the section of UNCLOS that deals with exceptions
to the flag state exclusivity rule, is to compensate the boarded ship “for any loss or damage that
may have been sustained” if suspicions prove unfounded.118 Such a policy essentially transforms
a form of property rule protection for ships suspected of transporting WMD into a liability
regime, with a basis for accountability both before and after the interdiction mission.119 Setting
monetary compensation for a violation of sovereignty is surely not a simple task, but the
alternative of never allowing searches regardless of the level of suspicion is untenable.
3. Proliferation Security Initiative
Neither the IMO nor the U.N. has independent enforcement mechanisms, so the ideal
entity to serve this function, preferably in conjunction with a Security Council interdiction
committee, is the PSI. An integrative approach would bestow much needed legitimacy on U.S.led actions and would also provide potentially essential multinational cooperation in tasks such
as freezing assets of WMD traffickers and providing access to air space and foreign bases.120
Especially if the Security Council integrates the SUA Convention amendments into an expanded
version of Resolution 1540, the PSI would enjoy new legal authorities to act upon as opposed to
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the current limitations imposed by UNCLOS. As mentioned in Part I.E, existing legal authorities
based upon a system of consent are only a partial answer to WMD proliferation and may not
reach the most likely abusers of the system. Although the PSI’s gradual accumulation of bilateral
boarding agreements may at some point form the basis for a universal right of interdiction based
on customary law, this is unlikely for the foreseeable future.121 Thus, the United States must
either attempt to assert a broader right of interdiction under the doctrine of self-defense, which it
has thus far been reluctant to do, or it must seek authority through international institutions, as
outlined in this section.
It may be that the United States has to “go it alone” in the event that the Security Council
does not authorize an interdiction mission that U.S. leaders believe is vital to national security.
Even the U.N. High-level Panel acknowledged that the Security Council “may well need to be
prepared to be much more proactive on [threats to international peace and security,] taking more
decisive action earlier, than it has been in the past.”122 If the Security Council fails to act or is
stymied by a stubborn dissenting veto, the United States will have to seek alternative authority.
One option is to turn to regional organizations, perhaps built on the PSI framework, and invoke
Article 52(1) of the U.N. Charter: “Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of
regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action . . . .”123 During the Cuban
Missile Crisis of 1962, for example, the United States legitimized its maritime quarantine based
on the provisions of the Rio Treaty of the Organization of American States, which sanctioned
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assistance to meet threats of aggression in the region.124 Although some legal scholars were
deeply critical of this justification,125 a similar strategy could serve to impose an inspection zone
in a troubled region, perhaps if intelligence indicated that North Korea was engaging in
widespread sales of WMD materials. As Ruth Wedgwood wryly observed, “If a maritime
quarantine against offensive weapons was legal enough for John Kennedy, some might say, it
should be legal enough for Ari Fleischer.”126
If even regional cooperation is not forthcoming, the United States would either assert a
revised conception of self-defense or ultimately rely on what Michael Byers termed “exceptional
illegality,” wherein a state simply chooses to violate the law rather than seek to modify it.127
Considering the politically sensitive nature of interdiction operations, and the need for
international cooperation in such missions, it is crucial that the United States do everything it can
to avoid this situation and maximize the possibility that action can be taken through the Security
Council.128 A sensible starting point is to ensure that all interdiction decisions are based upon
sound criteria. Numerous authors have put forward factors for consideration,129 but the Highlevel Panel has produced a list that is the most relevant in this context, including (1) the
seriousness of the threat; (2) the legitimacy of the purpose behind using military force; (3)
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whether the action is a last resort; (4) whether the means are proportional to the threat; and (5)
whether there is a reasonable chance of success.130
Given the immense danger posed by WMD, the relative lack of ulterior motives for
interdiction, the inability to defend against WMD use, and the focused nature of interdiction
missions, these criteria should not be as hostile to interdiction as they may first appear. They are
specific enough, however, to be preferable to a cost-benefit framework that boils down all the
variables to the question of whether a state believes that the expected harm of a potential attack
has reached an unacceptable level.131 One appropriate sliding variable might be the nature of the
WMD or precursor material, with nuclear weapons requiring a lesser degree of threat/imminence
than chemical weapons or dual-use items.132 Overall, these criteria should serve as a guiding
principle for any actor or institution deciding on interdiction, be it the United States, the PSI, or
the Security Council interdiction committee.
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Even before FDR applied the term to international affairs, states used quarantines to
protect themselves from threats on the high seas, requiring the temporary detention of incoming
ships and sailors to ensure that they did not pass on the plague or other infectious diseases.
Today, since a local system of quarantine is impractical with the flood of international trade and
travel, the quarantine must take on a global character, aiming to prevent the spread of WMD
altogether. This article began by showing why a new framework is needed, analyzing how export
controls, deterrence, defenses, or even more active disarmament measures will not easily contain
the WMD threat. Part II.A then examined the legal principles behind a global quarantine,
demonstrating that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter rests upon an evolving notion of self-defense
that may need to adapt in order to respond to catastrophic but non-imminent threats. Finally, this
article explored the various international institutions available to serve as a framework for a
global quarantine, concluding that the IMO can articulate principles which the Security Council
can extend and universalize, relying on the PSI for enforcement.
As I acknowledge in Part II.B, this article does not claim to identify the sole path for
achieving a global quarantine. Its main purpose is to demonstrate the urgency and sound legal
basis for a quarantine, as well as offer some initial ideas for how to begin making it a reality.
Some observers may contend that my proposals go too far and there is only a modest chance that
they will gain widespread approval. It may be that IMO members will refuse to make reforms to
the SUA Convention, and that Resolution 1540 represents the furthest the Security Council is
willing to go in countering proliferation. As Part II.B.3 reflects, though, in that event the default
situation is ever-increasing reliance on the PSI, since the threat posed by WMD will not go away
and cannot be ignored. The prospect of a more robust role for the PSI, given the prominent
position of the United States within it, may be disconcerting to much of the world. Many people
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are fearful of granting the United States any greater latitude in confronting proliferation and
terrorism than it already possesses, especially in light of its failure to find any WMD in Iraq.
However, as explained in Part II.A, the best way to maintain the relevance of international
institutions like the Security Council is to frame them so that the United States and others have
an incentive to use them. If the U.N. cannot expedite interdiction claims through a special
committee, there is little chance at all that PSI nations will turn to it for authorization.
Other critics may object that these proposals do not go far enough. As mentioned in Part
I.E, since interdiction relies heavily on intelligence capabilities and good fortune, some might
conclude that forcible disarmament is the only reliable solution. Especially if a series of WMD
terrorists attacks were to occur, I fear that victimized states would believe they had no other
choice but to eliminate all WMD supplies beyond their allies. Given the incredible risk and likely
damage from such a course, as outlined in Part I.D, I believe a global quarantine offers a middle
ground approach with the best matching of ends and means. To avoid leaving interdiction to the
United States alone, and to forestall more drastic disarmament measures, the world community
should join together to draw a clear line in the sand, on the water, and in the air forbidding all
forms of WMD transfer.
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